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ABSTRACT 
A 2012 Human-In-The-Loop air traffic control simulation 
investigated a gradual paradigm-shift in the allocation of 
functions between operators and automation.  Air traffic 
controllers staffed five adjacent high-altitude en route 
sectors and, during the course of a two-week experiment, 
worked traffic under different function-allocation 
approaches aligned with four increasingly mature NextGen 
operational environments.  These NextGen ‘time-frames’ 
ranged from near current-day operations to nearly fully-
automated control in which the ground system’s 
automation was responsible for detecting conflicts, issuing 
strategic and tactical resolutions, and alerting the controller 
to exceptional circumstances.  Results indicate that overall 
performance was best in the most automated NextGen 
environment.  Safe operations were achieved in this 
environment for twice today’s peak airspace capacity, 
while being rated by the controllers as highly acceptable.  
However, results show that sector operations were not 
always safe; separation violations did in fact occur.  This 
paper will describe in detail the simulation conducted, as 
well discuss important results and their implications. 
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BACKGROUND 
Predicted air traffic increases over the next 25 years may 
create a significant capacity problem that the United States’ 
National Airspace System will be unable to accommodate 
[1]. An automated separation assurance concept was 
proposed to help solve this problem [2]. However, the 
adoption of such an approach involves a fundamental 
paradigm shift in which automation is allowed to perform 
safety-critical tasks that today are strictly the air traffic 
controllers’ domain. Moving toward automated air traffic 
control, therefore, requires a careful and thorough 
investigation. 
GROUND-BASED SEPARATION ASSURANCE 
Separation management elements of en-route NextGen 
environments are envisioned to rely on automation to 
expand performance beyond today’s limits by off-loading 
workload from the controller onto automated functions for 
the majority of routine operations [3]. Use of automated 
conflict detection and resolution tools integrated within 
ground automation systems can therefore enable the 
controller’s working environment to move from tactical 
separation management to strategic decision-making.  In 
this ground-based approach, air traffic control automation, 
not the air traffic controller, monitors traffic for potential 
conflicts. The automation additionally conducts several 
workload-intensive routine tasks such as transferring 
ownership and communication frequencies between 
sectors. Relieved of these tasks, the controller can 
concentrate on managing non-routine operations that often 
require human intelligence, ingenuity, and experience.  The 
controller and the automation work cooperatively to enable 
the higher traffic demands of the future while ensuring the 
equivalent (or better) safety levels of today [4].   
Key Technologies 
For automation to successfully perform these new roles, 
technological enhancements over today’s operations are 
needed.  As such, effective integration of ground 
automation systems, controller work-stations, airborne 
automation systems, and flight-deck interfaces is an 
important enabler of this concept.  To achieve this 
integration, connections between these elements are made 
with the following: Automatic Dependent Surveillance-
Broadcast (ADS-B) surveillance providing more precise 
position, state, and intent data; Data Comm as the primary 
means of communication and clearance delivery for 
equipped aircraft; and Flight Management Systems that, in 
addition to allowing aircraft to fly along a 3D trajectory, 
can receive Data Comm messages such as frequency 
changes, cruise altitudes, route modifications, and speed 
changes.  Together, these elements create an investigative 
environment targeting automation’s role in separation 
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assurance, and the associated human-automation interaction 
issues. 
Included in this simulation was a version of the ground-
based separation assurance approach envisioned in a far-
term environment, based on the Advanced Airspace 
Concept (AAC), originally developed by Erzberger [2].  
The basic premise is to utilize two independent layers of 
separation assurance, with each technical sub-system 
designed to detect and resolve conflicts, but at different 
time-frames.  The Auto-Resolver algorithm works within a 
‘strategic’ time-horizon to ensure separation between 
aircraft for conflicts detected with more than three minutes 
until the predicted Loss of Separation (LOS). It computes 
complete (non-open-ended) trajectories to resolve these less 
urgent conflicts, which rejoin the aircraft’s original route.  
Even with improved surveillance capabilities, automation 
systems of the future will still produce trajectory 
predictions errors.  Using climb profiles as an example, 
some conflicts may not be detected early enough for the 
Auto-Resolver to address.  The Tactical Separation Assured 
Flight Environment (TSAFE) algorithm focuses on these 
short-term, ‘tactical’ conflicts detected with less than three 
minutes until a predicted LOS.  In these urgent situations, 
TSAFE computes an open-ended heading change to avoid 
the LOS and keep the aircraft clear a few minutes, and by 
doing so, provides time for the Auto-Resolver to find a 
complete trajectory-based solution.   
HUMAN-IN-THE-LOOP SIMULATION 
In addition to a roll-out of technological advancements over 
time, NextGen’s maturation process will likely also include 
a growing number of equipped aircraft, enabling higher 
utilization of automation for monitoring trajectories and 
managing separation assurance.  In August of 2012, the 
Airspace Operations Laboratory (AOL) at the NASA Ames 
Research Center conducted a human-in-the-loop simulation 
to investigate the issue of separation assurance function-
allocation between human operators and the automation 
[5-7].  The simulation tested four separate NextGen time-
frames, each representing a candidate level of aircraft 
equipage, and a potential stage of ground system 
capabilities in NextGen’s evolution.  The stages ranged 
from a near current-day, completely voice and manual 
control environment, to a far-term vision in which 
separation functions were performed almost exclusively by 
the automation, with the controllers acting as supervisors of 
the automation.   
The simulation also investigated allocating separation 
functions between the air and ground, by incorporating 
eight aircraft equipped to manage their own separation.  
Results showed the presence of these self-separating 
aircraft had no impact on the ground system’s performance 
[5].  Therefore, no distinctions between these two 
categories of aircraft are made in this paper; the analyses 
reported here treated all aircraft in the same manner. 
Study Design 
The study examined four conditions, one for each of the 
NextGen time-frames investigated.  Differences in the 
available automation capabilities, as well as different levels 
of aircraft equipage characterized each condition.  Keeping 
track of the differences between the complexities 
associated with each condition proved difficult for the 
participants, as evidenced during preparatory ‘shake-down’ 
simulations.  As a result, a randomized or counter-balanced 
run schedule was not pursued, and the four conditions were 
tested in order of their maturation/automation level: first 
the Baseline condition, followed by the Minimum NextGen 
condition, then Moderate, and lastly the Maximum 
NextGen condition.  Each stage took place over two 
consecutive days, during which the participants were 
briefed and trained on the operational environment, tools, 
and procedures on the first day.  The data collection period 
for each condition entailed six 40-minute runs, occurring 
on the second day.  The following sub-sections describe the 
four conditions in more detail. 
Baseline ‘Current-Day’ Time-Frame 
The Baseline time-frame served as a representation of a 
near-term NextGen with only few differences from current-
day, fielded operations.  The simulated operations for this 
time-frame assumed that all aircraft were equipped for 
ADS-B out; broadcasting their position and state 
information.  In using the more precise surveillance data, 
controller workstation displays showed a given aircraft’s 
target position, current altitude, and current ground-speed 
with a 1-second update rate.  The improved surveillance 
data also allowed for a change to aircraft target symbols, 
shown as directional chevrons.  Ownership and tracking 
status information were integrated into the chevron 
symbology, shown in Figure 1: solid and hollow chevrons 
represented owned and un-owned aircraft, respectively, 
while small and large chevron symbols indicated flat-track 
(on flight plan) and free-track (off flight plan) statuses, 
respectively. 
 
Figure 1. Chevron symbology and conflict list, as seen in the 
Baseline ‘Current-Day’ time-frame. 
Roles and responsibilities in the Baseline time-frame were 
unchanged from today’s operations.  Being responsible for 
maintaining safe separation between aircraft, controllers 
performed all conflict detection, evaluation, and resolution 
tasks.  Supporting the controllers in this task was a flight-
plan-aided conflict probe, which displayed detected 
conflicts in a conflict list window, shown in Figure 1, much 
like the User Request Evaluation Tool (URET). 
Controllers issued all clearances via voice, as no aircraft in 
the Baseline time-frame were Data Comm equipped.  
Controllers were also responsible for routine book-keeping 
tasks, just as they are in today’s operations.  These included 
hand-off initiation, hand-off accept, and transfer of 
communication (frequency changes). 
Minimum NextGen Time-Frame 
Envisioning a possible early stage of NextGen's evolution, 
the simulation’s Minimum NextGen time-frame introduced 
a limited Data Comm implementation.  25% of the aircraft 
were Data Comm equipped, which received slightly 
different handling than the unequipped aircraft.  For Data 
Comm equipped aircraft, the controller’s workstation 
automatically initiated out-going sector-handoffs and 
automatically accepted incoming sector-handoffs.  Once 
the receiving sectors accepted the automated hand-offs, the 
sending sector’s workstation automatically prepared and 
sent a Data Comm transfer-of-communication message to 
the aircraft, instructing them to switch to the next sector’s 
frequency.  Additionally, Data Comm equipped aircraft did 
not need to verbally check-in with the controller upon 
receiving the frequency change instruction.  Therefore, it 
was the automation that performed the hand-offs and 
transfers-of-communication for the equipped aircraft, 
easing any controller workload otherwise associated with 
such tasks.  Shown in Figure 2, Data Comm messages sent 
by the ground system’s automation, and the ‘ROGER’ or 
’UNABLE’ response message received from the flight-
deck, were displayed to the controller in an on-screen Data 
Comm message status list. 
 
Figure 2. Screen image from the Minimum NextGen time-
frame, showing the Data Comm status list, equipped (grey) 
aircraft, trial-planning capability, and conflict probe 
information integrated into the data blocks and altitude fly-
out menu. 
Serving as another potential early step in the evolution 
towards trajectory-based operations and more automated 
NextGen concepts, the Minimum NextGen time-frame 
included an assumption that allowed Data Comm equipped 
aircraft to follow their Flight Management System’s 
(FMS-) computed vertical profile.  Specifically, unless 
instructed otherwise by the controller, aircraft were ‘pre-
cleared’ to climb to their cruise altitude, and allowed to 
descend at their Top of Descent (TOD) point.  Because the 
controllers were still responsible for the separation of 
aircraft, they could issue any clearance deemed important 
for their sector’s safe operation; at which point an equipped 
aircraft receiving such an instruction would behave exactly 
as an unequipped aircraft.   
The automated hand-offs and frequency changes, together 
with the notion of being ‘pre-cleared’ to follow the FMS-
computed vertical profile, increased the likelihood that, 
nominally, the controller would not need to interact with an 
equipped aircraft at all.  This led to a change in the design 
of the equipped aircrafts’ data blocks, illustrated in Figure 
2.  In contrast to unequipped aircraft’s yellow data blocks, 
which cannot be collapsed while owned by the controller or 
geographically inside their sector, the data blocks of 
equipped aircraft were displayed in muted grey color, and 
were only shown as full data blocks if the aircraft was 
within 150 nmi. of the destination airport, or if the 
automation detected a traffic conflict for the aircraft.  
Intended to roughly coincide with an aircraft’s being just 
before their TOD point, popping up the data blocks relative 
to the destination airport was thought to help controllers 
maintain a level of awareness of the ‘pre-cleared’ vertical 
changes expected of the equipped aircraft.   
Decision-support tool enhancements for the controllers 
came in two other areas.  First, the conflict probe’s 
information was better integrated with the controller’s 
display: in addition to the conflict list, the remaining time 
until predicted LOS for a detected conflict was shown (in 
minutes-to-go) directly in the data block, supporting the 
controller’s traffic scan (see Figure 2).  Secondly, trial-
planning functions were available to help the controller 
plan aircraft trajectory changes.  The trial-planning tools 
allowed the controllers to craft a provisional trajectory for 
an aircraft, which was fully integrated with the 
automation’s conflict probe, as illustrated in Figure 2.  
Such integration provided what-if feedback, informing the 
controller as to the possible outcome of issuing the planned 
clearance, before actually doing so.   
Additionally, the trial-planning capabilities helped to 
enhance the data block altitude fly-out menu. By 
incorporating data available from the conflict-probe-
informed trial-planner, the altitude fly-out menu examined 
under-the-hood trial-plans for each flight level.  This in 
turn, was displayed to the controller such that they could, 
over a range of altitudes, quickly see which were clear of 
potential conflicts, and, for the flight levels not clear, see 
the time-to-predicted-LOS.  Originally based on the design 
from [8], an example of the altitude fly-out menu with pre-
probed altitudes is shown in Figure 2.   It is important to 
note that, as part of the Minimum NextGen time-frame, 
none of the trial-planning capabilities were integrated with 
Data Comm; all trajectory-related clearances were issued 
via voice for all aircraft.   
Moderate NextGen Time-Frame 
The continuation to the Moderate NextGen time-frame 
provided controllers with additional decision-support tools, 
while keeping the roles and responsibilities identical to 
those from the Minimum NextGen time-frame.  The 
Moderate time-frame included two additional assumptions, 
representing a further evolution of NextGen operations.  
First, the Data Comm capabilities were expanded to allow 
the sending of trajectory changes.  This meant that, in 
addition to transfer-of-communication messages, route 
modifications and/or altitude changes created through the 
trial-planning functions could be sent directly to the 
aircraft.  Also, a larger population of the traffic was 
assumed to be equipped for Data Comm; simulated here as 
50% of all aircraft. 
The Moderate NextGen time-frame added two decision-
support tools to address the strategic and tactical safety 
layers. A version of the Auto-Resolver algorithm was 
available to help the controller with the task of conflict 
resolution.  In the presence of a detected conflict, 
controllers could invoke the Auto-Resolver algorithm, 
which would search for a new trajectory that would resolve 
the conflict, and present that solution to controller in the 
form of a trial-plan.  The controller could then send the 
displayed trial-plan to the aircraft via Data Comm, just as if 
they had manually created the trial-plan themselves.  
Moreover, a trial-plan generated by the Auto-Resolver 
could be manually modified by the controllers, allowing 
them to use it as a starting point to then make adjustments 
before sending the clearance to the aircraft.  Several access 
points were available to the Auto-Resolver, offering a 
means for the controller to communicate vertical, lateral, 
and/or aircraft-specific preferences to the automation [6]. 
Additionally, the Moderate time-frame included TSAFE, 
marking the first time the automation provided support to  
 
Figure 3. A TSAFE advisory from the Moderate NextGen 
condition, suggesting the predicted LOS between WJA2652 
and JBU1119 can be avoided by turning the WJA right to a 
heading of 202 degrees, and turning the JBU left to heading of 
156 degrees. 
the controllers during urgent, tactical conflicts.  In the event 
of a short-term conflict, the ground system’s automation 
would calculate the heading changes needed to avoid the 
pending LOS, and, if possible, keep the aircraft free of 
other conflicts.  Displayed to the controllers in the data 
block’s 5th line (see Figure 3), the resulting headings served 
as reference information only: the controller could issue the 
suggested heading change via voice or Data Comm, or 
could issue something of their own choosing; whether it be 
a slight modification to the TSAFE advisory, or something 
completely different.   
Maximum NextGen Time-Frame 
Over the progression of the first three NextGen time-
frames, the controllers received increasing support from the 
automation to assist them in their responsibilities.  
However, this trend changed slightly in the fourth 
condition.  In the Maximum NextGen time-frame, all 
aircraft were Data Comm equipped, with an established 
electronic communication link to the ground.  
Consequently, Data Comm messages could be sent to the 
aircraft by the controller, and theoretically also directly 
from the automation, creating opportunity for a new 
distribution of tasks between the controller and the 
automation.  In comparison to the Moderate time-frame, the 
capabilities of the tools themselves changed only slightly, 
but how those capabilities were used was quite different, 
resulting in a true paradigm shift of air traffic operations.     
The Maximum NextGen time-frame investigated an 
allocation of air traffic functions between the controller and 
the automation, but it was the allocation of air traffic 
responsibilities that served as the foundation of the human-
automation cooperation scheme, and is what distinguished 
the Maximum NextGen time-frame from the other 
conditions.  Here, the automation’s responsibilities 
included three critical tasks: 1) conflict detection, 2) 
tactical LOS avoidance by means of automatically sending 
any pending TSAFE advisories for detected short-term 
conflicts when two minutes or less remained until the 
predicted LOS, and 3) alerting the controller to any 
problems or exceptional situations.  In addition, the 
automation worked within pre-defined limits to resolve 
conflicts detected within the strategic time-horizon, 
automatically sending the resolution trajectory to the 
aircraft.  Also, when an aircraft received an automated 
TSAFE instruction, the automation would then later follow-
up with a new trajectory that put the aircraft back on 
course, rejoining its original route.  Also, since all aircraft 
were Data Comm equipped, all hand-offs and transfers of 
communication were performed by the automation.  By 
allocating these responsibilities and tasks to the automation, 
the controller’s role changed significantly, to one more 
focused on supervisory and management-by-exception 
duties.   
It is important to note that the air traffic controller and the 
automation were jointly responsible for maintaining safe 
separation; however, under these operations, the controller  
 Figure 4. Screen image from the Maximum NextGen time-
frame, showing the automation status indicators in their 
various colors.  The small yellow box in the conflict list, 
signifying ‘needs controller attention,’ is coordinated with the 
conflicting aircraft highlighted with yellow full data blocks. 
would not be held accountable for a LOS in which the 
automation never detected the conflict, and/or never alerted 
the controller, and/or never issued a TSAFE advisory.  
In cooperation with the automation, the controller’s 
primary responsibilities were to supervise the automation 
and to resolve any situations flagged to them by the 
automation.  The automation displayed to the controllers 
the status of its efforts to resolve conflicts detected within 
the strategic time-horizon through colored boxes shown in 
the conflict list, examples of which are shown in Figure 4.  
These status indicators used five different colors to 
represent the five possible statuses of the automation’s 
conflict resolution process: 1) empty boxes signifying the 
automation was not working on that conflict, typically 
when a conflict was detected more than eight minutes away 
from the predicted LOS; 2) white-filled boxes signifying 
the automation was actively looking for a resolution to the 
conflict; 3) green-filled boxes signifying the automation 
successfully found a resolution to the conflict; 4) cyan-
filled boxes signifying the automation successfully 
uplinked the resolution to the aircraft; and 5) yellow-filled 
boxes signifying the automation either could not find a 
resolution to the conflict at all, or could not find a 
resolution within its pre-defined limits (i.e., one that 
imposed less than 90 seconds of delay, 60 degrees of 
heading change, 2200 feet of altitude change, or 50 knots of 
speed change). 
Tactical conflicts were generally handled by the automation 
with the automatic uplink of TSAFE advisories, but 
exceptions in this domain were of a different sort.  Rather 
than the automation alerting the controller to situations in 
which it needed help, here the controller could alert the 
automation to situations in which they wanted to assume a 
more hands-on role.  Similar to a manual override, this 
meant that controllers could inhibit the automation’s uplink 
of TSAFE advisories, so that they could address the 
situation in their own way.   
Airspace and Traffic 
Figure 5 illustrates the simulated airspace used for this 
study, consisting of five adjacent test sectors, all in the 
high-altitude en route airspace of Cleveland Air Route 
Traffic Control Center (ZOB).  These sectors were divided 
across two areas of specialization: sectors 26, 38, and 79 
pertained to the North area, while sectors 49 and 59 
belonged to the South area. The floor of the overall test 
airspace was set at flight level (FL) 330. One participant, 
working as the radar controller, and one supporting 
confederate controller working as the radar associate, were 
assigned to each of the five sectors. Confederate “Ghost” 
controllers were responsible for the airspace surrounding 
the test area. Sector geometries and traffic flows combined 
to create natural variations in complexity between the 
sectors. 
 
Figure 5. Test airspace used for the simulation. 
Originally based on actual traffic flows from the ZOB area, 
the traffic scenarios included a mix of arrivals and 
departures from nearby airports, as well as overflights.  In 
keeping with the availability of new technologies and 
decision support tools, as well as an increasing number of 
aircraft equipped for Data Comm, traffic densities in the 
scenarios increased from one condition to the next, 
illustrated in Figure 6.  The Baseline condition used traffic 
levels representative of today’s operations, with a Monitor 
Alert Parameter (MAP) of 18 aircraft per sector.  The 
Minimum NextGen time-frame saw traffic levels increase 
by 20% to a MAP value of 22 aircraft per sector, while the 
Moderate NextGen time-frame simulated a 50% increase in 
traffic, with a MAP value of 27 aircraft.  In the Maximum 
NextGen time-frame, traffic levels were double those of the 
Baseline condition, using a MAP value of 36 aircraft per 
sector. 
Participants 
Seven Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) front line 
managers (six current and one recently retired) served as 
primary participants; five as radar controllers and two as 
area supervisors. Eight additional retired controllers 
supported the test participants, five working as D-sides for 
the test sectors, and three handling the traffic in the ‘ghost’ 
sector outside the test airspace.  Ten type-rated airline 
pilots operated eight mid-fidelity, single-aircraft flight  
 Figure 6. Peak traffic levels for each of the four conditions. 
simulators, and ten general aviation/corporate pilots 
operated multi-aircraft stations.  
Separate rooms housed the North and South areas (Figure 
5).  The configuration of each test sector included a 
primary radar display and a nearly identical radar associate 
(D-side) display. Area supervisors assigned to each room 
monitored the traffic situation as well as the workload of 
the participant radar controllers, and judged whether/when 
D-side support was needed.  
Equipment 
Other than the eight single-aircraft flight simulators using 
the Aircraft Simulation for Traffic Operations Research 
(ASTOR) software developed at NASA’s Langley 
Research Center [9], the primary simulation platform used 
for the study was the Multi Aircraft Control System 
(MACS).  Hosting a Display System Replacement (DSR) 
emulation, each controller workstation utilized a large-
format monitor and a specialized keyboard and trackball, 
similar to those used in current air traffic control facilities.  
Voice communications occurred through a custom, stand-
alone voice application, meant to emulate the fielded 
system. Data recorded and collected at each workstation 
included aircraft flight states, operator task data, 
automation states, voice communications, etc.  Screen 
recordings captured as movie files were also saved.  
Workload Assessment Keypads (WAKs) probed controller 
workload at three-minute intervals during simulation trials 
using Air Traffic Workload Input Technique (ATWIT) [10] 
ratings on a modified six-point scale (1 as low workload, 6 
as high workload). The controllers completed 
questionnaires at the end of each run, as well as a post-
simulation questionnaire.  Debrief discussions provided an 
additional opportunity for controllers to offer feedback. 
RESULTS 
Select results from the simulation are described in the 
following section.  Other publications are available that 
provide additional descriptions and explanations of the data 
produced during the simulation [5-7].   
Detected Conflicts 
Predictions by the automation that an aircraft would come 
too close to another aircraft resulted in a detected conflict.  
The automation used ‘detection buffers’, thereby including 
additional safety margins in its search for conflicts.  In 
most cases, the automation probed for conflicts using 
separation minima of 5.9 nmi. laterally and 1,000 feet 
vertically.  However, uncertainties associated with climbing 
and descending aircraft, as well as aircraft off of their 
expected trajectory, required minor changes to system 
settings in order to increase stability and minimize false 
and late alerts.  For climbing and descending aircraft, the 
automation utilized expanded buffers in the vertical 
dimension of 1,500 feet.  For off-trajectory aircraft, the 
automation used a reduced look-ahead time of five minutes 
(compared to 10 minutes nominally). 
Throughout the simulation, the automation detected a total 
of 2,323 unique pairs of aircraft in conflict.  Figure 7 shows 
the distribution of these conflicts across the four conditions.  
The quantity of detected conflicts generally increased with 
the different NextGen time-frames; an expected result 
given their increased traffic levels. 
 
Figure 7. Number of conflicts detected by the automation in 
each of the four conditions. 
Safety 
A LOS event occurred when two aircraft in the simulation 
were simultaneously closer than 5 nmi. laterally and 800 
feet vertically. Additionally, a LOS had to occur within the 
test sectors after the first 5 minutes of a run and persist for 
at least 12 consecutive seconds.  From the 2,323 detected 
conflicts, a total of 25 resulted in LOS events, the 
distribution of which across the NextGen time-frames is 
shown in Figure 8.  Interestingly, the Baseline and 
Maximum conditions showed equal safety performance, 
despite the latter having twice the amount of traffic.  A 
clear majority of the LOS events (60%) occurred in 
Moderate condition, a surprising result, given that the 
Maximum condition had comparable amounts of detected 
conflicts (Figure. 7). 
Workload 
During the simulation, controller responses to real-time 
workload queries utilized the scale’s entire range.  In the 
Maximum condition however, controllers never rated their 
workload above 3.  Illustrated in Figure 9, mean workload 
ratings were similar for the Baseline, Minimum, and 
Moderate conditions, while workload reported in the 
Maximum condition was lower.  On average, the Maximum  
 Figure 8. Number of losses of separation occurring in each of 
the four conditions. 
condition’s workload across the test sectors was just below 
2, considered to be ‘low’ workload.  Statistical testing 
confirmed this to be significantly different than the 
workload ratings from the other conditions (z = 55.08, df = 
3, p < .000), all with averages of nearly 3, or ‘moderate.’  
An analysis of workload data from post-run questionnaires 
verified these findings, showing similar trends [7]. 
 
Figure 9. Mean real-time workload ratings across all 
participant radar controllers for each of the four conditions. 
Situation Awareness 
Post-run questionnaires asked the controllers to judge their 
own situation awareness by rating their level of ‘situational 
understanding,’ their ‘capacity to take in more 
information,’ and the ‘demand on their attention.’  Ratings 
from these three scales formed an overall situation 
awareness score, or Situation Awareness Rating Technique 
(SART) score, which ranged from -5 (low situation 
awareness) to 13 (high situation awareness) [11].  The 
mean SART scores computed for each condition are 
depicted in Figure 10.  
Overall, the controllers gave higher situation awareness 
ratings in the three NextGen time-frames, as compared to 
the Baseline condition.  The SART scores in both the 
Baseline and Moderate conditions, although slightly higher 
in the Moderate condition, signal ‘moderate awareness’ on 
behalf of the controllers.  Perceived situation awareness 
increased in the Minimum and Maximum conditions, the  
 
Figure 10. Mean SART scores across all participant radar 
controllers for each of the four conditions. 
latter with a SART score just above 10, considered to be 
‘high awareness.’  Statistical testing confirmed this to be a 
significant difference (z = 46.14, df = 3, p < .000). 
Acceptability 
Another subjective measure obtained through 
questionnaires was the Controller Acceptance Rating Scale 
(CARS) [12].  Derived from controllers’ answers to several 
yes-no questions regarding how safe, adequate, 
satisfactory, and acceptable the operations were, the overall 
CARS scores served as an assessment of the controllers’ 
comfort level with the simulated operations.   
The mean CARS scores indicate that, for the most part, the 
controllers rated the operations as acceptable, although 
acceptability was lower for the Moderate condition.  
Statistical testing verified this as significantly different (z = 
12.22, df = 3, p < .007), driven in large part by ‘unsafe’ 
ratings occurring in 40% of the controllers’ scores in the 
Moderate condition.   
 
Figure 11. Mean CARS scores across all participant radar 
controllers for each of the four conditions. 
CONCLUSIONS 
With regard to the question: “How effectively did the 
controllers and automation cooperate?”, promising results 
from the Maximum condition appear to suggest a 
successful cooperation: compared to the other conditions, it 
had the highest levels of traffic, nearly the highest number 
of detected conflicts, safety performance equal to that of 
the Baseline condition; but recorded the lowest workload, 
highest SART, and highest CARS scores.   
Even though the Moderate condition had substantially 
fewer aircraft than the Maximum condition, the number of 
detected conflicts for both conditions was quite 
comparable, suggesting that additional (i.e., secondary) 
conflicts were possibly created by the controllers’ own 
actions in the Moderate condition.  This theory may also 
help explain the increase in LOS events in the Moderate 
condition, but further analyses are needed.  Indeed, the 
Moderate (and also the Minimum) condition, at times, 
resulted in unacceptable safety measures.  Furthermore, the 
situation awareness and acceptability data from the 
Moderate condition provide additional evidence that may 
point to ineffective controller-automation cooperation.  
These results create a need to better understand the 
complexities of the simulated operations, and how they 
interacted with the studied function allocation schemes.   
From this perspective, the question becomes: “is the 
effectiveness of a given controller-automation cooperation 
scheme context-dependent?”  The progression of the four 
conditions saw an essentially linear increase in overall 
traffic, increase in Data Comm equipped aircraft, and 
increase in decision-support tool capabilities.  Changes to 
task responsibility however, progressed in a discrete, step-
function-like manner, affecting only the Maximum 
condition, in which the nature of the controllers’ job was 
very different.  Perhaps changes to the allocation of 
responsibilities occurring in earlier NextGen time-frames, 
such as in the Moderate condition, would have resulted in 
better system performance.  What if, for example, the 
Moderate condition had allocated separation responsibility 
for Data Comm equipped aircraft to the automation, while 
the controller managed the unequipped aircraft?  Follow-on 
investigations are needed to explore this trade-space.  
The safety data indicates that during the Minimum and 
Moderate NextGen time-frames, the traffic situations may 
have been beyond the limits of the ‘system’s’ capability, 
with ‘system’ represented by the function allocation 
schemes used during the simulation.  One could conclude 
that the manner in which controllers and automation 
cooperate (i.e., the cooperation’s effectiveness), is certainly 
a direct result of the function allocation schemes 
themselves, but perhaps is also impacted by the context, 
subtleties, and intricacies of the working environment 
(traffic density, etc.).   
Investigations into the uniqueness of the Moderate 
condition have already begun [6-7].  Forthcoming analyses 
will focus on quantifying the complexities of the traffic 
situations and look to identify factors that correlate to when 
the operations started to break down.  Additional analyses 
will examine other measures of performance for the four 
conditions, such as flight path efficiency.   
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